The aimless musings of a guys whose bright ideas evaporate when commited to paper. Things that rattle around in my head include, life, politics, things Korean and of course variety meats.

Sunday, November 19, 2023

Constitutional Fantasy League

Despite all the possibilities, practical politics has settled on essentially just two ways to structure democratic government, presidential and parliamentary and I wondered how close a presidential system could get to parliamentary without crossing the line. Not a French dual executive, not the South African executive president (chosen by and responsible to the legislature, this is a really a prime minister). I took inspiration from that cradle of strong democracy, South America. In Bolivia, after the restoration of democracy in the 80s rhe president was elected together with the legislature, the presidential vote was also the party vote in a mixed-member proportional legislature. The runoff however was held among the top three candidates and was voted on, not by the people but by the legislature. In at least one case this saw the third place finisher chosen. Thus a president must have majority support from the legislature. The other South America innovation is the delightfully named muerte cruzada meaning 'crossed death' or more prosaically 'mutually assured destruction'. In situations where there is a deadlock between the president and the legislature, the president may dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. This is not a particularly novel power, however unusually it also requires the president to face a special election at the same time (as an aside, a similar provision exists in Namibia but I've seen no commentary on it). The legislature also has a similar power, when a president is impeached and removed, the legislature too runs in the special election. When combined, these two concepts from the Andes would produce a presidential system with key elements of parliamentarism, albeit attenuated. The president requires a legislative majority in order to be installed and may be removed due to a loss of legislative support. Imagine for a moment an alternate United States, one where constitutional revision is commonplace and and this system has been implemented. The House of Representatives now has four year terms to match the president. Citizens vote President and their preferred party with one vote and for their local rep with the other. If no presidential candidate wins a majority there is a contingent election in the House but unlike the system that. elected John Quincy Adams, members vote individually, not by state. In order to aid in coalition building, the cabinet is presented as a unit for confirmation and legislature members can serve in the cabinet with the help of election substitutes. There is also a Senate, but it is a very different body. It is not elected but appointed by state governments. It's membership varies somewhat with population but it still doesn't claim proportionality. Its main power is that of legislative inquiry and on most legislation it has only a suspensive veto. With regard to the budget it lacks even that power. However, with regard to legislation affecting the relationship between the states and the federal government, it can defeat legislation, though even here its powers are constrained. A bill defeated in the Senate can be revived by a vote in a joint session of Congress where, given the disparity in size, only a united Senate can defeat a divided House. In keeping with the parliamentary influence, the budget is central. It is introduced by the President and may be approved, modified or defeated in the House (the Senate can propose amendments but on budgetary matters, the House isn't obliged to consider them). It is considered on a strict time-limited calendar, first in committees and then on the floor. If the budget is amended, the President may sign or veto it and the House can override with just an absolute majority of all it's members (abstentions and absences count as no votes). If either the president's supporters or opponents are united a budget will become law. If not, a second defeat or upheld veto is one of the triggers for new elections.